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Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
State of Montana:
Constitutional Limitations on State Energy
Resource Taxation
This note examines the case of Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of
Montana, where the United States Supreme Court analyzed and defined
the permissible limitations of state energy resource taxation. While the
Court adhered to the test of constitutional taxation established in Com-
plete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, which strongly upheld a state's sovereign
right to tax a local incident of interstate commerce, the Court failed to re-
alize the practical ramifications of its ruling in the context of the nation's
energy problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1921, Montana has levied a severance tax on the mining of
coal within its borders.' There is nothing in itself unusual about
severance taxes; many states exact them for the extraction of nat-
ural resources. 2 Seventeen states impose severance taxes on coal
1. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-1314 (Supp. 1975).
2. "A severance tax may be defined broadly as a levy assessed at fiat or grad-
uated rates by a government on the privilege, process, or act of commercially sev-
ering ... natural resources from the soil ... and measured by the physical
amount or gross of net value of the natural resources produced .... " Lochner,
The Economic Effect of the Severance Tax on the Decisions of the Mining Firm, 4
NAT. RESOURCES J. 468, 469 (1965). Montana justified its severance tax on the fol-
lowing grounds:
Severance taxes are levied upon a state's natural resources for several
reasons. One, obviously, is the need for revenue. Another is that a state's
resources, particularly its mineral resources, are nonrenewable. When the
resources are mined, the state loses a valuable asset forever. The levying
of a severance tax is one manner by which the state can share in the profit
associated with the extraction of a mineral asset. A severance tax, more-
over, can help discourage wastes; a basic assumption of severance taxa-
tion is that future generations will need mineral resources similar to those
used today.
MONTANA LEGISLATIVE SUBCOMMrrrEE ON FossIL FUEL TAXATION, INTERIM STUDY 3
(1974), cited in Note, The Increasing Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxa-
tion and Federal Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L REV. 675, 677 n.8 (1979) (hereinafter
cited as The Increasing Conflict.) The most obvious correlation to severance taxa-
tion is the special cost incurred by the state as a result of the mining activity tak-
ing place, especially strip mining activity. Facilities are built for mining industries
that do not serve the general public. Also, special costs are borne by the state as a
result of the boom towns that spring up alongside the mines. "The impact on state
treasuries is heightened by the fact that much of the energy development is occur-
ring in sparsely settled, remote areas with minimal physical and service infra-
mining.3 However, what is highly questionable and extremely
controversial,4 in light of current energy problems,5 is the unprec-
edented rate of severance taxation on coal mining in Montana,
which stands at thirty percent of the contract price of mined coal
as a result of a 1975 statute.6
Montana's tax has caused a furor among mining companies,
utility companies, and consumers. In 1978, Commonwealth
Edison Company and fourteen other plaintiffs brought suit
against Montana, seeking both refunds of severance taxes paid
under protest and declaratory relief,7 contending that the tax was
structure." Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Severance Taxation, 20
NAT. RESOURCES J. 887, 903 (1980).
3. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, West Virginia, Wyoming. Proposed Amendments to Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act: Hearings on S. 2695 Before The Sen. Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1980).
4. "Several Commentators have agreed that Montana and other similarly sit-
uated western states have pursued a policy of OPEC like revenue maximization,
and that the Montana tax accordingly bears no real relationship to the services
and protection afforded by the state." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101
S. Ct. 2946, 2967 (1981), quoting R. NEHRING, B. ZYCHER & J. WHARTON, COAL DE-
VELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION IN THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS: A
PRELIMINARY REPORT 148 (1976).
5. The availability of energy resources, and the price which they com-
mand, is one of the most divisive issues of our time. Armed with unfet-
tered power and freed from constitutional restraint, the self-interests of
energy rich states must come into conflict with those which lack such re-
sources and with the national interest in energy issues ....
Montana's tax is a prime example of the abuses which may flow from
any rule which leaves the states with the unfettered power to tax.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
"If unchecked by this Court, the exorbitant severance tax on essential energy
resources may become the latest variant of the kind of divisive and recriminatory
state action which made the Constitutional Convention essential." Brief Amici
Curiae, 101 S. Ct. 2946, in support of appellants from the states of Connecticut,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and Wisconsin.
6. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979) Severance Tax Rates Imposed:
1). A severance tax is imposed on each ton of coal produced in the
state in accordance with the following schedule:
HEATING QUALITY SURFACE MINING UNDERGROUND MINING
(btu/lb of coal)
under 7,000 12 cents or 20% of value 5 cents or 3% of value
7,000 - 8,000 22 cents or 30% of value 8 cents or 4% of value
8,000 - 9,000 34 cents or 30% of value 10 cents or 4% of value
over 9,000 40 cents or 30% of value 12 cents or 4% of value
"value" means the contract sales price.
2). The formula which yields the greater amount of tax in a particular
case shall be used at each point on this schedule.
3). A person is not liable for any severance tax upon the first 20,000
tons of coal he produces in a calendar year.
7. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana, No. 42567 (Mont. 1st Judi-
cial Dist., filed June 20, 1978). The plaintiffs were seeking a return of $5.4 million
[Vol. 9: 487, 1982] Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
invalid under the Commerce Clause8 and the Supremacy Clauses
of the United States Constitution. Without receiving any evi-
dence, the trial court upheld the tax, and the Montana Supreme
Court affirmed,' 0 dismissing the claim for failure to state a cause
of action upon which relief could be granted." For reasons which
will be examined herein, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the decisions of the lower courts and upheld the tax.'2
U1. COAL RESERVES IN MONTANA: FACTS OF THE CASE
The state of Montana occupies a unique geological position with
regard to this nation's physical distribution of coal reserves, for
located within its boundaries is approximately one-quarter of the
United State's entire reserve of coal, and over one-half of its low
sulphur coal.13 Not only are the coal reserves in Montana enor-
mous, but they are also among the cleanest in the nation, since
very low sulphur coal (less than one percent sulphur) accounts
for ninety-four percent of the coal mined in Montana.*4
The positioning of these low sulphur reserves is indeed fortui-
tous for Montana,15 since recent federal legislation has en-
dollars of severance taxes paid under protest. The original plaintiffs were Com-
monwealth Edison Company, Central Illinois Light Company, Dairyland Power
Cooperative, Interstate Power Company, Lake Superior District Power Company,
Lower Colorado River Authority/City of Austin, Minnesota Power and Light Com-
pany, Northern States Power Company, Upper Peninsula Generating Company,
Wisconsin Power and Light Company, Decker Coal Company, Peabody Coal Com-
pany, Westmoreland Resources Inc., and Western Energy Company. No. 42567
(Mont. lst Judicial Dist., filed June 20, 1978).
8. "Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. U.S. CONST.
art. I, §8, cl. 3.
9. The "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... [s] hall be the
Supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana, 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980).
(Justice Sheehy wrote the opinion in which Haswell, C.J., and Daly, Harrison, and
Shea, J.J., concurred.)
11. In the author's opinion, the dismissal of the case without any factual scru-
tiny of the tax is the central issue, and is fully discussed in the analysis of Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion and in the analysis section infra.
12. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
13. Energy Fact Book, DATA ON ENERGY RESOURCES, RESERVES, PRODUCTION,
CONSUMP'ION, PRICES, PROCESSING AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 582 (1980).
14. Proposed Amendments to the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act;
Hearings on H.R. 6625, 6654 and 7163 before the Sub. Comm. on Energy and Power
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13
(1980).
15. 101 S. Ct. at 2965 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing J. KRuTaA, A. FISCHER
couraged, and in some cases even mandated, increased national
reliance on coal as this nation's primary energy resource.16 In ad-
dition, several other Congressional enactments 17 and statements
given by several recent Presidents 8 demonstrate a growing na-
tional awareness of the dangers of increased reliance on foreign
petroleum imports, and the benefits of the accelerated production
of domestic coal.19
Were it not for the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,20 Mon-
tana would not enjoy such a strategic advantage, nor would it
have the right to tax the severance of much of its coal, for sev-
enty-five percent of the coal reserves found in Montana are lo-
& R. RICE, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF COAL DEVELOPMENTS NORTHERN
GREAT PLAINS XVI (1978)).
16. The primary statute presented by the plaintiffs in this area was the Power-
plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (Supp. 1I 1979). This act
"encourage(s) and foster(s) the greater use of coal ... in lieu of natural gas and
petroleum, as a primary energy source," and intends to "prohibit, or, as appropri-
ate, minimize, the use of natural gas and petroleum as a primary energy source
.... " Furthermore, section 8341(a) (1), states that "natural gas shall not be used
as a primary energy source in an existing electric power plant on or after January
1, 1990"; and subsection (b) "prohibit(s) ... the use of petroleum or natural gas
... as a primary energy source in any existing electric power plant, if ... such
power plant has or previously had the technical capability to use coal or another
alternative fuel as a primary energy source."
17. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871,
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1976 & Supp. II 1979)); Energy Reorganization Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976)); Energy
Research & Development Administration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-39, 91 Stat. 180
(codified at 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 11 1979)); Energy Supply and Environmental Coordi-
nation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 791 (1976 &
Supp. II 1979)); Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377,
90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Federal Non-Nu-
clear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-577, 88 Stat.
1878 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5901 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. 111 1979)).
18. President Nixon gave the following message to Congress:
Coal is our most abundant and least costly domestic source of energy.
Nevertheless, at a time when energy shortages loom on the horizon, coal
provides less than 20% of our energy demands and there is serious danger
that its use will be reduced even further ....
I urge that highest national priority be given to expanded development
and utilization of our coal resources .... Each decision against coal in-
creases petroleum or gas consumption, compromising our national self.
sufficiency and raising the cost of meeting our energy needs.
President's Energy Message to Congress, 9 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 389, 395
(April 18, 1973). See also President's Statement on Signing National Energy Bills,
14 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRES. Doc. 2138 (Nov. 9, 1978).
19. "Coal offers two critical advantages over oil and gas: freedom from both
the instability of foreign markets and the whim of foreign suppliers, and vast
reserves." The Increasing Coqflic4 supra note 2, at 675 n.1. It is estimated that the
"total fossil mineral energy reserves in the United States are approximately 98%
coal and 2% oil and gas." Whiteside and Gillig, Coal and Conservation-Tax Pol-
icy, 64 KY. L.J. 573, 574, (1975-76).
20. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976 & Supp. I 1979), as amended by Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083.
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cated under land owned by the federal government.21 Presently,
such coal is mined under private leases from the federal govern-
ment. These leases are obtained according to the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act of 1920,22 which permits Montana to exercise its right
to levy and collect taxes upon the mining activity as if the federal
government were not involved.23
As previously mentioned, Montana has levied a severance tax
on the mining of coal since 1920. While this particular statute was
not challenged until the present suit, other taxes in eastern
coal mining states were challenged soon after the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act was passed.24 The Supreme Court resolved these
21. Brief for the Appellant at 16, 101 S. Ct. 2946.
22. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976 & Supp. DI 1979).
23. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976 & Supp. IIJ 1979)
states that "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the rights
of the states or other local authority to exercise any rights which they may have,
including the right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines,
or other rights, property, or assets of any lease of the United States." This policy
was thoroughly articulated in Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U.S. 45 (1925):
The more natural view, and the one we adopt, is that Congress, having
provided for leasing the public lands to private corporations and persons
whose property, income, business and occupations ordinarily were subject
to state taxation, meant by the provision to say in effect that, although the
act [this chapter] deals with the letting of public lands and the relations
of the government to the lessees thereof, nothing in it shall be so con-
strued as to affect the rights of the states, in respect of such private per-
sons and corporations, to levy and collect taxes as though the government
were not concerned.
Id. at 48-49.
24. See Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). This was an early
challenge to a state tax upon the severance of coal. Although not a severance tax
by name, the Pennsylvania law challenged by the Colliery Company provided that
each ton of coal mined should be "subject to a tax of one and one half percentum
of the value thereof when prepared for market." Id. at 253. At the heart of the ap-
pellant's challenge, which is also the essence of Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
State of Montana, was whether a severance tax levied on a resource primarily
destined for interstate commerce could be taxed by the state where it was mined,
or whether such taxation constituted an impermissible burden upon interstate
commerce. The Court developed a rigid mechanical test in determining the valid-
ity of the tax, focusing upon the inherently intrastate character of the mining of
coal. From the often quoted opinion:
[T]he contention is that the products of a State that have, or are destined
to have, a market in other States, are subjects of interstate commerce,
though they have not moved from the place of their production or prepa-
ration.
The reach and consequences of the contention repel its acceptance. If
the possibility, or, indeed, certainty of exportation of a product or article
from a state determines it to be in interstate commerce before the com-
mencement of its movement from the State, it would seem to follow that it
is in such commerce from the instant of its growth ... and in the case of
challenges in favor of the states, upholding their sovereign power
to tax the mining of coal within state boundaries. For some time
following these early cases, severance taxes went unchallenged.
Because there was nothing extreme or unusual about the initial
Montana tax, it also was quietly paid for many years. It was con-
sidered by the mining and utility companies, who initially
shouldered the tax, as simply a cost of doing business, which they
in turn, passed on to ultimate consumers of the energy produced
by the coal.25
However, in 1975, there was an enormous increase in the rate of
coal severance taxation in Montana. Mining companies who had
previously paid an average of $0.34 per ton severance tax now
found themselves paying an average of $2.08 per ton, and in some
cases the severance tax increased the cost to as much as $4.08 per
ton of coal mined.26
As a result, in 1978, suit was filed in Montana district court,27
challenging the tax as unconstitutional and violative of the Com-
merce and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution.
The district court dismissed the claim for failure to state a cause
of action upon which relief could be granted,28 and the Montana
Supreme Court affirmed.29 The case was appealed to the United
coals, as they lie in the ground. The result would be curious. It would na-
tionalize all industries, it would nationalize and withdraw from state juris-
diction and deliver to federal commercial control the fruits of California
and the South, the wheat of the West and its meats, the cotton of the
South ....
Id. at 259.
See also Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923); Hope Natural Gas
Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927). Both cases supported state severance taxes against
constitutional challenges.
25. Prior to the 1975 act increasing the Montana severance tax, the typical sev-
erance fee paid was $0.34 per ton. Brief for Appellant, at 7-8, 101 S. Ct. 2946. Mon-
tana and Wyoming export the bulk of their coal. In 1978, 53 utilities in 21 states
bought Montana and Wyoming coal, with 82% of the demand originating from out
of state. In 1987, 92% of the demand will originate from other states. HOUSE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, LIMITATION ON COAL SEVERANCE
TAXATION, H.R. REP. No. 1527, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1980) (hereinafter cited as
LIMITATIONS ON COAL SEVERANCE TAxATION). These purchases are done almost
solely according to long-term contracts (over twenty years or more) with specific
mines and coal producers. Prior to 1975, when the increased severance tax was
passed, twenty utilities had signed these long term contracts for a total of 800 mil-
lion tons of coal. Id. at 4.
26. LIMITATIONS ON COAL SEVERANCE TAXATION, supra note 25, at 3. Commen-
tators have suggested that the Arab oil embargo made Montana legislators aware
of their potentially advantageous position on the domestic energy scene. Id. For a
general discussion of the actions of the Montana Legislature, see generally Limita-
tions on Coal Severance Taxation, supra note 25.
27. No. 42567 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist., filed June 20, 1978).
28. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 25 ch. 20 (1979).
29. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana, 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980).
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States Supreme Court, which affirmed the ruling.30
III. HISTORY OF COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO
STATE TAXATION
Even a brief glance at the history of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions analyzing the validity of various types of state taxation
reveals a confusing, tortured history of case law.31 Here, the anal-
ysis was divided into two parts: a Commerce Clause challenge
and a Supremacy Clause challenge. By far the most byzantine
challenge has historically been that of the Commerce Clause,
since the Supreme Court has struggled with various concepts and
theories in developing a method to determine the constitutional
validity of state taxes upon goods moving in interstate
commerce.
32
Before a decision was rendered in Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady ,33 there were basically two competing concepts in deter-
mining when a state could validly impose a tax upon interstate
trade.34 One theory was based on the idea that interstate com-
merce should be immune from the burdens of state taxation in or-
der to promote free trade between the states.35 The second major
30. 101 S. Ct. at 2964.
31. The Supreme Court's decisions delineating the constitutional limita-
tions on state tax power have often defied rational analysis .... Indeed,
the Court came to recognize that consistency was not the hallmark of its
pronouncements in this field (citing Northwestern States Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)), that form occasionally
prevailed over substance (citing Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S.
110, 122-23 (1954)), and that to attempt to harmonize all that has been said
in the past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the fu-
ture (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Ap-
proach to Constitutional Adjudication? 75 MICH. L. REV. 1426, 1426 (1977) (herein-
after cited as Hellerstein).
32. "This case by case approach has left much room for controversy and con-
fusion and little in the way of precise guides to the states in their indispensable
power of taxation." Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
33. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
34. 101 S. Ct. at 2964.
35. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
The Commerce Clause ... by its own force created an area of trade free
from interference by the States. In short, the Commerce Clause even
without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the
power of the States .... A state is also precluded from taking any action
which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of
trade between States.
Id. at 252. See also Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925), wherein
concept was that each state had a right to require that interstate
businesses bear their proper share of the costs of supporting the
local and state governments from which they were deriving bene-
fits. 36 A shifting emphasis away from both of these two extremes,
to the idea that in each case the practical effects of the scruti-
nized tax should be a determining factor in deciding its constitu-
tionality, was noted in 1970 in the case of Pike v. Bruce Church
Inc. 37
Also to be considered in the Supreme Court's analysis of the
scope of the Commerce Clause are those cases which do not deal
with taxation at all, but rather, with the scope of federal authority
under the Commerce Clause. These cases, articulating together
the "substantial affect" doctrine, have played an important role in
developing the Supreme Court's approach in determining the
the Court noted that "The protection against imposition of burdens upon inter-
state commerce is practical and substantial and extends to whatever is necessary
to the complete enjoyment of the right protected." Id. at 565.
36. The contrary view, holding that taxes may constitutionally be imposed
upon the local incidents of interstate commerce, was established in the following
line of cases: Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), where
the Court held that a tax of a local business which is separate is not forbidden
under the Commerce Clause:
It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in
interstate commerce from their just share of the tax burden even though
it increases the cost of doing business ....
All ... taxes in one way or another add to the expense of carrying on
interstate commerce, and in that sense burden it, but they are not for that
reason prohibited.
Id. at 254-55. In addition, the case of Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976), noted that the limitation upon the state power to tax provided by the Com-
merce Clause was by no means absolute. In the absence of conflicting legislation,
the states retain authority through their police powers to regulate matters of "le-
gitimate local concern," even though interstate commerce may be affected. Id. at
371. See also Simet & Lynn, The Demise of Spector, 31 NAT. TAX J. 53 (1978).
37. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In this case, a state agricultural regulation affecting the
packaging and transportation of agricutural products was struck down because its
practical effect was found to be too burdensome to a cantaloupe grower whose
packaging plant was 31 miles away, and just happened to be located in another
state. The test, as articulated by the Court, is as follows:
[T] he general rule statute that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where
the regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.... The question becomes one of
degree, and the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142. (emphasis added). See also Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416
(1946), where the Court noted that a state tax, having a substantial economic ef-
fect, actual or potential, upon interstate commerce, is not validated by the fact that
it is laid upon a local incident which is separate and distinct from interstate trans-
portation. Id. at 423. "It is an old doctrine, notwithstanding many early deviations,
that the practical operation of the tax, actual or potential, rather than its descrip-
tive label, or formal character, is determinative." Id. at 424 n.9.
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proper balance between federal and state power.3 8
These divergent theories ultimately coalesced into a four-part
test to determine the constitutional validity of a state tax on an
interstate business in the case of Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady.39 In the Complete4O case, the challenged tax was purport-
edly levied on the privilege of conducting a portion of an inter-
state business within the state of Mississippi. The Supreme
Court did not uphold the tax as merely one in which the state was
validly imposing a tax on a local incident of interstate commerce.
Rather, the Court repudiated the established concept of "privi-
38. In essence, these cases support the plaintiffs' contention that the sever-
ance tax substantially affects interstate commerce, and therefore, Court scrutiny
of its constitutional validity is required. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1
(1824), which held that the states do not have the authority to burden interstate
commerce or to regulate those phases of the national commerce which, because of
the need for national uniformity, demand that their regulation be prescribed by a
single authority. In NLRB v. Jones-Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936), the
"substantial affect" doctrine was articulated, defining those instances where Con-
gress' right to control interstate commerce would supersede state regulation. "Al-
though activities may be considered intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect the commerce from
burdens or obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control." Id. at 37. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the right to regulate
commerce was extended to those activities solely intrastate which affect interstate
commerce, since the Court upheld the Congress' power to regulate the amount of
wheat grown and sold solely within a state. Extending and further developing this
doctrine were the companion cases of Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), civil rights
cases supporting the power of Congress to regulate motels and restaurants. The
Court noted that "[tihe power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also
includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities
in both the state of origin and destination ... which might have a substantial and
harmful effect upon commerce. Id. at 258. See aLso United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942). While these cases more directly support the notion
that Congress would have the authority to regulate a state's severance tax if it
were found to substantially affect interstate commerce, they may also be viewed
as determining precedentially what the Court has determined as being "in
commerce".
39. 430 U.S. at 279. "The decision indicates that the [CIommerce [C]lause...
is to be viewed as restraining the exercise of state tax power without creating a
broad zone of tax immunity for the constitutionally protected interest." Heller-
stein, supra note 31, at 1442. It is ironic to note that in the instant case, as it was
dismissed without trial, a broad immunity for severance taxation seemingly was
created.
40. Briefly, a Mississippi tax on the privilege of doing business in the state
was held by the Court not to violate the Commerce Clause when applied to an in-
terstate activity. As the text notes, the Court repudiated the privilege concept en-
tirely, and fashioned a four-step test to determine the constitutionality of state
taxes on interstate commerce. 430 U.S. at 279.
lege" taxation entirely, and announced that the Commerce Clause
is no bar to carrying on an interstate business in the taxing
state.41 In addition, the Court made "it clear that the [Com-
merce] [CIlause had not created an irreducible zone of tax immu-
nity unrelated to its purposes."42 A new constitutional test was
developed to clarify the permissible range of state taxation of in-
terstate commerce.
The four-part test for determining the constitutional validity of
a state tax will be sustained under Complete if it is "applied to an
activity which a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and is fairly related to the services provided by the state."43 Addi-
tionally, the Court noted: "[tihere is no economic consequence
that follows necessarily from the use of the particular words 'priv-
ilege of doing business,' and a focus on that formalism merely ob-
scures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden
effect.""
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE 4 5
A. The Montana Supreme Court's Analysis
The first finding of the Montana Supreme Court in its Com-
merce Clause analysis was that the true taxpayers in the case
were the Montana coal producers themselves, and not the utility
companies who had joined in the action or the consumers who
would eventually pay the severance tax in increased energy
bills.46 Therefore, the court felt it proper only to look to the status
41. Id. at 282.
42. Hellerstein, supra note 31, at 1445.
43. 430 U.S. at 279. In developing the test, the Court relied explicitly on the
following cases as precedent: Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250 (1938); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Wisconsin v. J.C.
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940). These terms will be analyzed in depth in the sec-
tion relating to the holding of the United States Supreme Court.
44. 430 U.S. at 288. In a footnote supplementing this idea, the Court stated:
It might be argued that "privilege" taxes... are easily tailored to single
out interstate businesses and subject them to effects forbidden by the
Commerce Clause .... Any tailored tax of this sort creates an increased
danger of error in apportionment, of discrimination against interstate com-
merce, and of a lack of relationship to the services provided by the State.
A tailored tax, however accomplished, must receive the careful scrutiny of
the courts to determine whether it produces a forbidden effect on interstate
commerce.
Id. at 288-89 n.15 (emphasis added).
45. 615 P.2d 847, 850-58 (Mont. 1980). As did the United States Supreme Court,
the Montana Supreme Court divided its analysis into two distinct sections,
treating the Commerce Clause challenge first.
46. 615 P.2d at 850. The Montana court noted that it was the coal producers to
whom the money would be returned if it were refunded.
[Vol. 9: 487, 1982] Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of the coal producers at the time the resource was severed in de-
termining the validity of the tax.47
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the dis-
trict court which had decided that the activity of mining coal was
per se not within interstate commerce.48 This led properly to the
conclusion that the applicable test for determining the validity of
the tax was the Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. 49 approach. 50 In
addition, the Montana Court also applied the four-part test de-
tailed in Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady,51 emphasizing par-
ticularly the fourth prong, the "fairly related" test.52 The court
deemed that the plaintiffs were misdirected in their belief that it
was the duty of the court to factually scrutinize the rate of the tax
and the amount of revenue it generated.53 The court instead felt
47. With a theme strongly protective of states' rights, the Montana Supreme
Court bluntly held:
We are not required here to determine whether the mined coal should not
be considered a part of interstate commerce .... There is no need to con-
cern ourselves with such fine points here. The severance itself is a taxa-
ble event and . . . is therefore ahead of . . . the power of Congress . . .
such a decision would shatter the shield of judicially-approved states'
rights ....
Id. at 857.
48. The district court determined that the cases relied on by the plaintiffs fell
into four categories, which are set forth here with examples:
1). When Congress has asserted its regulatory power under congres-
sional acts (NLRB v. Jones-Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937));
2). When the state engages in a regulatory activity of interstate com-
merce (Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970));
3). When the state imposes a tax upon interstate commerce activity
(Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)); and
4). When the state imposes a tax on an activity which is not in commerce
(Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922)).
615 P.2d at 850.
49. 260 U.S. 245 (1922). For a brief overview of the case, see note 24 supra and
accompanying text.
50. As the United States Supreme Court opinion expressly rejects the Heisler
analysis in its opinion, any further discussion of it with respect to the Montana
Supreme Court is omitted. 101 S. Ct. at 2952.
51. 615 P.2d at 855.
52. Id. The court noted with great emphasis that the coal producers had at
their disposal all of the services and benefits that the Montana State government
could offer, and in addition, the coal producers, through their strip mining activi-
ties, were themselves extracting a tremendous benefit from the state. Id.
53. Id. The Montana Supreme Court was apparently very concerned about
the consequences of a ruling allowing judicial inquiry into the rates of severance
taxes, as the following passage indicates:
[F] or if the rate of tax on a local activity, as here, can be found to violate
the commerce clause, then certainly the amount of tax raised by a state
or local activity is in the same jeopardy. Were we or the United States
that because the tax was a general revenue tax, the proceeds of
which were applied to the general support of the government, the
"fair relation" aspect of the text was fulfilled.54
B. The United States Supreme Court's Analysis
Justice Marshall, writing the majority opinion for the Supreme
Court,55 agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the Heisler
"mechanical" approach56 no longer accurately reflected the law
concerning permissible state taxation of interstate commerce,5 7
and declared that the severance tax would be properly evaluated
under the tests set forward in Complete Auto Transit Inc. v.
Brady.5 8 In discarding the Heisler59 approach, Marshall stated
that "[iln reviewing Commerce Clause challenges to state taxes,
our goal has been to establish a 'consistent and rational method
of inquiry into the practical effect of the challenged tax,' "60 and
Supreme Court to reach that result, then we should see, in the words of
the old spiritual, that "the walls came a-tumblin down".
Id. at 854.
54. Id. at 856. See also notes 59, 75, 125, 132, 140-44 infra and accompanying
text.
55. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and Rehnquist
joining the majority.
56. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
57. 101 S. Ct. at 2952. The Court stated:
Heisler's reasoning has been undermined by more recent cases.... [I~t
evolved at a time when the Commerce Clause was thought to prohibit the
States from imposing any direct taxes on interstate commerce ....
The Court has, however, long since rejected any suggestion that a state
tax or regulation affecting interstate commerce is immune from Com-
merce Clause scrutiny because it attaches only to a local or intrastate
activity.
Id. See also Hellerstein, Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation
of Energy Resources, 31 NAT. TAx J. 245, 249 (1978).
58. 430 U.S. at 279 (1977). As previously noted, the state tax challenged in
Complete was that of a "privilege" tax, and was, as such, specifically tailored to
fall upon interstate commerce. Id. at 288-89 n.15. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the nature and effects of severance taxes are not at all analogous to
the sort of tax analyzed in Complete, but are akin to exportation taxes:
Like a toll gate lying-athwart a trade route, a severance or processing tax
conditions access to natural resources. Although in all likelihood sever-
ance taxes rarely reflect special expenses incurred by the state in protect-
ing the act of extraction. . . they are tolerated because of the mechanical
notion that the act of production is remote from interstate commerce ....
There may also be a feeling that a state has an owner's interest in the de-
posits and is impoverished when they are taken out of the state .... The
state's resources are diminished not by the severance of the mineral, for
the extractive process adds to its value, but by exportation-and the com-
merce clause clearly prohibits the imposition of a tax on exportation.
Note, Developments in the Law in State Taxation, 75 HAv. L. REV. 953, 970-71
(1961-62).
59. 101 S. Ct. at 2952.
60. Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)). This case
was an application of the four-part test in Complete; its application was toward the
taxation scheme of income received from a foreign, interstate corporation, and was
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noted that the same test should apply to Commerce Clause chal-
lenges of state severance taxation.61 The Court felt that intra-in-
terstate dichotomies present in Ieisler were irrelevant for two
reasons.62 First, in Marshall's view, there was no real distinction
in terms of economic effects between severance taxes and other
sorts of taxes that had been subject to Commerce Clause scru-
tiny.63 Secondly, the act of severance, like any other local inci-
dent of interstate commerce, should be made to pay its fair share
in meeting the costs of supporting the local and state govern-
ments from which it derives benefits.64
In reviewing the plaintiffs' argument, the Court noted that the
plaintiffs had not disputed the contention that the Complete test
was the proper method for evaluating a state severance tax. 65
The Court recognized further that the plaintiffs were not disput-
ing the contention that the first two parts of Complete, those
held not to burden interstate commerce. As will be discussed more fully herein,
the four-part test formulated is of little value in determining the validity of sever-
ance taxation when applied to a proportional tax such as Montana's, as the test
will necessarily lead to the conclusion that the tax is constitutional. The reasoning
is practically mechanical:
1). the activity, mining, certainly has a substantial nexus with the taxing
state;
2). it is non-discriminatory as it applies to all producers of coal;
3). it is fairly apportioned, since the tax on severance can occur in no
other state and therefore there is no danger of multiple taxation; and,
4). under the court's reasoning, if the tax is proportional to the contract
value of the coal mined, it is fairly related to the services provided by the
state, and no further scrutiny is warranted.
It is the author's suggestion that the Complete test is not readily applicable to inci-
dents of severance taxation since it produces, necessarily, the outcome that the
tax is constitutional if it is proportional. If the Court truly sought to examine the
practical effect of the challenged tax, then scrutiny of the facts, especially in such
a potentially explosive issue such as this, would have been warranted.
61. 101 S. Ct. at 2952-53. It is the author's contention that a consistent and ra-
tional method of inquiry into the practical effects of the tax would reveal the po-
tential for destruction that the tax holds for fragile interstate relationships. This
tax will hopelessly embroil states in conflicts over taxation of energy resources at
a time when strong, unified interstate relationships are needed most. The broad
support the Supreme Court gives to a state's sovereign power to tax flies in the
face of the national cohesiveness required to triumph over the energy crisis.
62. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
63. 101 S. Ct. at 2953, citing Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347
U.S. 157 (1954). On its face, Marshall's contention is valid. However, economic ef-
fects should not be the sole concern of the Supreme Court. Examining the practi-
cal effects of the challenged tax on energy resources should necessarily
encompass the broad ramifications this tax has for the nation as a whole.
64. Id. Again, this issue of a proportional tax supporting a state's general rev-
enue fund will be more fully discussed below.
65. 101 S. Ct. at 2954.
which required a substantial nexus and fair apportionment, were
satisfied. 66 The Court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs'
Commerce Clause challenge dealt only with the third and fourth
parts of the Complete test.67 The plaintiffs argued that the third
prong, which prohibited discrimination, 68 was violated since
ninety percent of the coal mined in Montana was shipped out of
the state under contracts that shifted the burden of tax to con-
sumers who had no voice in the creation of the tax.69 In addition,
the plaintiffs also disputed the application of the fourth prong of
the Complete test,70 in that they contended that the severance tax
was not fairly related to the services provided by the state.
In dismissing the first of the two contentions, Marshall deemed
that an allegation of tax discrimination failed because the sever-
ance tax was levied equally upon all coal producers in the state,
with no distinction as to whether the coal was intended for ship-
ment out of state.71 The Court found little merit in the plaintiff's
contention that the severance tax was discriminatory under the
Commerce Clause simply because the tax was shouldered prima-
rily by out of state consumers, since a similar argument was "con-
sidered and rejected in Heisler."72
What seemed to be central to the plaintiffs' argument,73 namely,
the idea that Montana should not be allowed to exploit its monop-
66. Id. There can be no question that the act of mining coal very definitely ful-
fills the requirement of substantial nexus. In this particular case, there is no dan-
ger of unfair apportionment, as the taxing activity only occurs in Montana, and is
not taxed in any other state.
67. 101 S. Ct. at 2954-55.
68. 430 U.S. at 288. See notes 43 supra and 71-76 infra and accompanying text.
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2953. Cases cited by the Court in which taxes were found to
be discriminatory are an aid to understanding the Court's approach in Common-
wealth Edison. The case of Maryland v. Louisiana, 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981) dealt with
a state tax on the "first use" of natural gas taken from the federally owned outer
continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. The gas flowed through processing plants
in Louisiana and through interstate pipelines to consumers in over 30 states. The
Court deemed this to be a continual flow of natural gas interstate and held that as
a result of tax exemptions given to instate natural gas suppliers, the first use tax
was shouldered entirely by out of state consumers, and constituted an impermissi-
ble burden on interstate commerce, for the benefit and protection of instate produ-
cers and consumers. The instant case may be similarly analyzed, in an instance
not addressed by the majority. Part of MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. 15-35-103 (1979) ex-
empts the first 20,000 tons of coal produced in the state from the tax; this has the
practical effect of favoring the smaller, instate coal companies who do not pay tax
on substantially on all of the coal they produce. See Boston Stock Exchange v.
State Tax Comm. 429 U.S. 318 (1977) for a further application of the 'impermissible
discrimination' standard.
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2955.
71. Id. It must be remembered, however, that smaller coal producers in Mon-
tana benefit from section three of the taxing statute, as this section of the statute
exempts the first 20,000 tons of coal produced. See note 6 supra.
72. Id. at 2954.
73. Brief for Appellants at 5-6, 101 S. Ct. 2946.
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olistic position with regard to its resources by passing the thirty
percent severance charge onto customers who, in the near future,
would be depending on Montana's large coal reserves for their en-
ergy needs,74 was not regarded as an issue by the Court. In ad-
dressing this contention, Justice Marshall characterized the
plaintiffs' exploitation theory as one that would "give the resi-
dents of one State the right to control ... the terms of resource
development and depletion in a sister State."7 5 The Court relied
on its finding that there was no distinction between the tax treat-
ment of the intrastate and interstate producers of coal, and that,
for this reason, Montana was hardly exploiting its advantageous
position by exporting the tax burdens out of state. Instead, the
Montana legislature merely levied a tax on anyone who mined
coal in the state. The tax more than satisfied the third prong of
the Complete test, in the Court's opinion.76
In the final segment of its analysis of the Commerce Clause
challenge, the Court held that the plaintiffs' discrimination con-
tention ultimately collapsed in light of their argument that the tax
violated the fourth prong of Complete, under which the plaintiffs
had claimed that the revenues generated by the thirty percent
surcharge were not fairly related to the services provided by the
state.7 7 Marshall felt that when the plaintiffs conceded that the
state had some power to tax the severance of minerals, the dis-
crimination allegation was weakened substantially.
In arguing that the thirty percent tax was generating revenues
not fairly related to the services provided by the state, the plain-
tiffs had contended that the Complete test merited a factual scru-
tiny of the practical effects of the challenged tax.78 However, the
Court held that this was an incorrect interpretation of the fourth
prong of the Complete test, and, in addition, that alternative con-
74. Id.
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2955.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See note 59 supra and notes 124-31, 135 & 139-43 infra and accompanying
text. An interesting argument raised by the plaintiffs was that scrutiny is espe-
cially mandated in the instant case where the legislative history of the Montana
tax shows an utter absence of political controversy, discussion, or debate that is
normally characteristic of legislative action. "The Legislature saw, and seized, an
opportunity to enrich Montana's treasury without any burden to the state, without
any effect on the state's residents, without any pain to the state's taxpayers."
Brief of Amici Curiae at 8. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Bald-
win v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
tentions, either that the tax was intended to reimburse Montana
for costs of specific services provided by the coal mining industry,
or that a state's power to tax an activity connected with interstate
commerce cannot exceed the value of the services provided to the
industry, were both invalid.79 The Court's holding that such fac-
tual scrutiny was not mandated under Complete was based pri-
marily on the characterization of the severance tax as a general
revenue tax imposed for the general support of the government.80
In so holding, the Court found no requirement that the tax be rea-
sonably related to the value of the services provided by the
state.81
Further, noting its recent holding in Colonial Pipeline Co. v.
Traigle,82 the Court felt that freeing interstate businesses from
contributing to the general costs of providing for government
service, apart from those directly attributable to the taxed activ-
ity, would place such businesses in a "privileged position," 83 and
that the Commerce Clause was not designed to prevent interstate
activity from sharing in the burden of supporting state govern-
ments, even though doing so increases the costs of doing busi-
ness. 84 The Court justified the tax as being fairly related to the
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2955-56.
80. Id. at 2956.
81. Id. The Court cited to Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S.
495, 521-22 (1937), where the Court had noted that taxes are often imposed on a
class of individuals which enjoys no direct benefit from expenditure of the tax.
See also Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 280 (1898); St. Louis & S.W.R.R. Co. v.. Nattin,
277 U.S. 157, 159 (1928). In Commonwealth Edison, the plaintiffs had questioned
the characterization of the tax as a general revenue tax since in 1978 Montana citi-
zens voted to place 50% of the revenues generated from the tax into a permanent
trust fund, the principle of which cannot be disturbed except upon a three-
quarters vote of both Houses of the Legislature. MoNr. CONST. IX, cl. 5 As noted
by the Court, "Nothing ... prohibits ... Montana from choosing to allocate a por-
tion of current tax revenue for use by future generations." 101 S. Ct. at 2956 n.11.
One might argue that a glance at the legislative history of the Montana tax and
the constitutional amendment suggest that the tax revenues are meant to rectify
the problems created in Montana by the coal mining industry, and that the trust
fund was set up to insure that once the resources are depleted from the -state,
Montana citizens will still retain some of the benefits of the mining activity. The
characterization of the tax as a general revenue tax by the Montana Supreme
Court, also subsequently adopted by the United States Supreme Court, appears to
be at odds with the specific purposes of the tax as articulated by the Montana Leg-
islature. Were the tax to be specifically tied to the coal mining industry, perhaps
the Court would have then been urged to apply a cost-benefit balancing test in re-
gard to the tax.
82. 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975), which quoted Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev-
enue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2957.
84. Id. (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975)). As
enumerated in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S., 207, 228
(1980), these burdens include sharing in the cost of providing police and fire pro-
tection, with the corresponding benefit of a trained work force and "the advan-
tages of living in a civilized society" (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
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services provided by the state since the tax was taken as a per-
centage value of the coal mined rather than as a flat, across the
board tax imposed without regard to the extent of the mining ac-
tivities in the state.85
In addition, the Court declined to investigate the actual rate of
the tax for other reasons. Establishing tax rates, the Court stated,
was a legislative rather than a judicial matter.8 6 Furthermore, the
Court felt that fashioning a constitutional test for appropriate tax-
ation rates would be nearly impossible, taking into account the
myriad of social, demographic, economic, and political considera-
tions undertaken by a legislature when imposing a tax.8 7 Such a
test, in the Court's view, would be too vague and broad to have
any applicability to a particular challenge to a state taxation
statute.8
8
In summary, the Court dismissed appellants' Commerce Clause
challenge by relying on the Complete test. The Court found that
the tax did not impermissibly discriminate against interstate com-
merce, since it was levied equally among all those mining coal in
the state, noting that the fact that the tax happened to fall upon
interstate consumers had no bearing on the validity of the tax it-
self. Also, the Court found that the tax, being proportional in na-
ture to the amount of mining done in the state, was fairly related
to the services provided by the state. The Court saw no need to
establish a cost-benefit inquiry upon the consequences of the tax;
the mere fact that the state had the right to levy a tax on inter-
state business for the support of the local government was a
strong enough basis to uphold the tax under a Commerce Clause
challenge.
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979)). See Washington Dept. of Revenue v. Association
of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750-51, 764 (1978); General Motors Corp. v.
Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1969). The Court in Commonwealth Edison am-
plified upon this relationship in a later portion of the opinion, noting that these
benefits are not "amorphous incantations designed to avoid a more searching in-
quiry. . . ." 101 S. Ct. at 2960.
85. 101 S. Ct. at 2958; see National Geographic Soc'y v. California Board of
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Dept.
of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2959. See also Helson Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 252
(1929).
87. Economic, demographic, geographic, social and political consideration
were among those mentioned by the Court. 101 S. Ct. at 2959.
88. Id.
C. Historical Analysis of Supremacy Clause Challenges
The basic theory underlying any challenge to a state statute
brought under the Supremacy Clause89 is that the state law is in-
valid due to the preemption of that particular field of legislation
by the federal government. 90 As with the Commerce Clause, the
history of the preemption-Supremacy Clause issues is both com-
plex and confusing, since the theories offered by various Supreme
Court decisions over the years have been affected, to a great ex-
tent, by the political makeup of the Court at that time.9 1
Despite the confusion, continual challenges to state legislation
under the Supremacy Clause have yielded three definite avenues
of analysis by which cases may be scrutinized. Consequently,
three rather definite tests are applied to the various cases. 92 The
first is the "direct conflict" theory.93 Under this approach, the
Court will analyze the state and federal statutes side by side, and
determine if a true, actual conflict exists.94 The second applicable
preemption test involves an examination of the subject matter at
issue, and a determination of whether there is a need for national
89. U.S. CONST. art. XI, cl. 2.
90. One Author has suggested that "[t]he word [preemption] is used to de-
scribe the legal effect of the federal government's power to exclude a state.from an
area of legislation or the constitutional impotency of the states to intrude into an
area of legislation." Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemp-
tion, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 630 n.1 (1971-72) (hereinafter cited as Freeman).
Preemption takes place when state legislation prevents the "accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). This case, a hallmark in preemption analysis, dealt
with the invalidation of a state statute which was essentially similar to the federal
Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (repealed June 27, 1952, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-06 (1976)). In this case the federal statute was "so intimately blended and
intertwined with the responsibilities of the national government [as to present] a
complete scheme of regulation. . ." in the area, which precluded states from inter-
fering with it. 312 U.S. at 66-67. The importance of Hines is that it declared the
courts competent to find preemption even though express Congressional intent to
occupy the field may have been lacking. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L REV. 623 (1975)
(hereinafter cited as Note). Subsequent cases applying this standard included
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 157 (1942) and Rice v. Santa Fe El-
evator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
91. "It is submitted that these [cases] are so hopelessly confused, and that the
doctrine is used so often in place of mere logically available arguments, that they
provide little guidance for our analysis." Freeman, supra note 90 at 631. See also
Note, supra note 90, at 623-24. "The Supreme Court ... has not developed a uni-
form approach to preemption; its decisions in this area take on an ad hoc, unprin-
cipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis." Id. at 624.
92. Freeman, supra note 90, at 636.
93. Id. at 636 n.33.
94. Id. The clearest example of a conflict would be federal law compelling an
action that is forbidden under state law, or vice versa. This is generally the theory
applied in the instant case. The inherent problem with this approach occurs when
neither statute is explicit, and the underlying conflicts between the two laws be-
come increasingly subtle.
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uniformity of regulation regarding the subject.9 5 The third major
test articulated by the Court has been to determine if the federal
legislation at issue manifests an indisputable purpose on the part
of Congress to preempt the entire area of legislation regarding the
particular issue.9 6 Perhaps the most perplexing of these theories
in practice is the direct conflict theory when no actual conflict in-
volved, but it is hypothesized by a party that a conflict may poten-
tially develop between the federal and state laws such that two
incompatible standards of conduct will eventually be compelled.
Such is the problem in the instant case.9 7
In Commonwealth Edison, the plaintiffs did not contend that
federal legislation created an incompatible standard of conduct;
rather, they maintained that the tax, especially its extreme rate,
"substantially frustrated" the purposes of these congressional en-
actments. 98 Coupled with the basic complexity of '"potential con-
flict" cases is the added confusion injected by the recent shift in
95. Freeman, supra note 90, at 636 n.33. The leading case articulating this the-
ory is Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). In that case, a
certain Pennsylvania law required that a sum of money be paid to a charity if a
ship entering port did not have a pilot on board. The Congress had deferred the
issue of license requirements for the pilots to the states, but had passed a law re-
quiring that each vessel be equipped with a licensed pilot. The Court held that
this state regulation did not conflict with any federal navigation law:
[t] he nature of this subject is such, that until Congress should find it nec-
essary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the States;
that it is local and not national; that it is likely to be best provided for, not
by one system, or plan of regulations, but by as many as the legislative
discretion of the several States should deem applicable.
Id. at 319. For an application of this theory to the present case, see note 97 infra.
96. Freeman, supra note 89, at 636 n.33. The leading case in this field is Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 250 (1947), wherein the Court held that an
Illinois state statute regulating the warehousing of agricultural products was void
under the United States Warehouse Act, 39 Stat. 486, as amended by 7 U.S.C. § 241
(1976). The Court held that the strong wording of the federal statute evidenced
Congressional intent to preclude state regulation by adopting the words "the
power, jurisdiction, and authority" of the Secretary of Agriculture "exclusive with
respect to all persons" licensed under the Act. 331 U.S. at 229.
97. Perhaps the plaintiffs' argument would have appeared stronger to the
Court if the plaintiffs had argued for application of the relevant portions of all
three of these tests, emphasizing such factors as: (1) the need for national uni-
formity of regulation over such a potentially destructive issue such as energy re-
sources; (2) the Congressional intent of the PIFUA as it mandated the use of coal
as a primary energy resource by 1990; (3) how excessive taxation rates frustrate
the mining of coal to meet national energy needs; and (4) the conflict, albeit sub-
tle, of the excessive taxation rates and the national energy policy toward the in-
creased use of coal.
98. 101 S. Ct. at 2956.
the Court's emphasis upon federal-state relations.9 9 The Court
has demonstrated in several recent decisions that a state-directed
view of preemption analysis is to be favored.100
With this background in mind, a consideration of the majority's
holding in the present case becomes much clearer. Keeping in
mind the consistent emphasis upon states' rights, the fundamen-
tal confusion when there exists no direct conflict between the fed-
eral and state legislation, and the deference historically accorded
severance and general revenue taxation in the broad sense, the
majority's holding was almost predictable.lOl
V. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE CHALLENGE
A. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920
The plaintiffs had contended that the Montana severance tax
was invalid under the Supremacy Clause because it "substan-
tially frustrated" the purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
of 1920102 by disrupting the federal statutory scheme which pro-
vided for the division of lease revenues between state and federal
99. There is a '[c]oncern for state sovereignty which has led the Supreme
Court to give an increasingly narrow reading to the preemption doctrine, and so
give states more breathing room as long as they do not trample squarely on fed-
eral statutes .... ." J. CHOPER, Y. KAMASAR & L, TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT:
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 93 (1979).
100. Note, supra note 90, at 639, 642-45. These cases include: Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) ("marks the reemergence of a state presumption");
Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) ("[tlhe Court placed the protec-
tion of state interests above certainty in the accomplishment of federal interests");
New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) ("con-
cerned itself less with protection of inviolability of federal scheme than with
preventing the potential impairment of the state's ability to handle... mounting
welfare costs"); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973) ("if Congress is authorized to act in a particular field, it should manifest its
intention clearly").
101. The Montana Supreme Court deemed that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to a trial on the Supremacy Clause challenge, as the court felt plaintiffs' allegation
of "substantial frustration" of federal policy as defined by the broad dictates of the
enumerated acts set forth by the plaintiffs, see note 17 supra and accompanying
text, was "not a sufficient basis to trigger a factual determination" of the allega-
tions set forth. 615 P.2d at 860. Noting that no state excise tax had ever been de-
clared invalid unless it specifically conflicted with an Act of Congress, the court
held that no excise tax should be struck as invalid because of its rate and the
amount of revenue it generated, unless it was shown to be expressly prohibited by
a federal act. Id. at 861. See Penn. Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n 318 U.S.
261 (1943), which held that "[an] unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside
statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be inferred
... " Id. at 275. The court also cited Western v. City Council of Charleston, 127
U.S. 449 (2 Peters 449) (1829) for the declaration that a state's power to tax is a
fundamental feature of its sovereignty that cannot be set aside on "Weightless
statements that a federal policy is being substantially frustrated." 615 P.2d at 861.
102. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976), as amended by Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 Pub. L. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083.
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governments. 0 3 The foundation of the argument was that the se-
vere rate of the tax would cause potential lessees not to bid on
future federal lease arrangements, thereby reducing the total
rents available to the federal government.104 The Court dismissed
this argument with two replies. The Court first noted that Con-
gress in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act expressly authorized
states power to impose severance taxes, in spite of the terms of
the allocation formula,105 without imposing any limit on the rate
of such taxes. Therefore, the Court held, there was no preemp-
tion of the power of Montana to impose severance taxes, at least
with respect to the 1920 Act.' 0 6 The Court also responded to the
preemption argument in a second fashion,107 holding that the fed-
eral allocation scheme was meant only to secure "a fair return to
the public" with regard to capturing the economic rents, and not
to secure a certain amount of revenue under the allocation
formula.108
103. The central idea in this analysis is the concept of "economic rents," which
is the difference between the cost of production, including a reasonable profit, and
the market price of the coal. 101 S. Ct. at 2952. These rents, under stipulations of
the 1920 Act, are to be "captured" by the federal government in the form of royalty
payments for the leases. The original 1920 Act provided that all receipts from the
leases were to be divided between the states and the federal government as fol-
lows: 37.5% to a reclamation fund created by the Reclamation Act of 1902; and the
remaining 10% to be deposited into the Treasury of the United States under mis-
cellaneous receipts.
In 1975, the allocation formula was altered by § 9(a) of the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 181
(1976 & Supp. 1II 1979)) and the following formula was provided: the states now
get 50% of the economic rents; the general reclamation fund to help pay for the
environmental costs of mining gets 40% of the rents; and the Federal Treasury
gets 10%.
104. 101 S. Ct. at 2961-62. The Court felt that the factual premise of this argu-
ment, that the principal effect of the tax is to shift a major portion of the "eco-
nomic rents" from the Federal Treasury to the coffers of the state of Montana, is at
odds with the Commerce Clause argument that the tax will increase the price of
coal, thereby increasing the total economic rents available. This dichotomy is per-
haps best explained by noting that the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause contention
dealt with the present effects of the 30% tax while their Supremacy Clause chal-
lenge dealt with the effect of the tax on future leases entered into.
105. This argument reveals the "direct conflict" theory of the preemption doc-
trine in action. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
106. 101 S. Ct. at 2961.
107. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
108. 101 S. Ct. at 2961, quoting H.R. REP. No. 681 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975).
Furthermore, the Court noted that to carry the argument to the logical extreme
would mean that no severance tax was permissible, since any tax would diminish
the economic return to the public. This would, in the court's opinion, conflict with
B. Substantial Frustration of National Energy Policies
The final argument addressed by the majority was that the
Montana tax was invalid since it substantially frustrated national
energy policies as articulated in several Congressional enact-
ments and Presidential statements'0 9 which encouraged the use
of low sulphur coal to meet the nation's growing energy needs.
The plaintiffs had argued that they were entitled to a hearing on
the merits of their claim, both to explore the contours of these
policies and to determine the extent of actual conflict between the
severance tax and the acts mentioned above." 0
The Supreme Court recognized the plaintiffs' recitation of the
numerous federal statutes encouraging the use of coal, particu-
larly low sulphur coal,"1 but rejected the contention that these
federal statutes preempted the state legislation at issue.112 The
the express wording of the 1920 Act permitting severance taxation. 101 S. Ct. at
2961.
109. See notes 17 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
110. Brief for the Appellant, 101 S. Ct. 2946.
111. 101 S. Ct. at 2962. In the opinion of the district court of Montana, an inter-
eting contention was raised that later was not addressed in the Supreme Court's
opinion. The district court noted that western coal, compared with midwestern
and eastern coal, did have a much lower sulphur content, but that this fact, in it-
self, did not give support to the idea that national energy policies are totally de-
pendent on the increased utilization of low sulphur coal. After noting several
statutes proffered by the plaintiffs that purportedly encourage the use of low
sulphur coal, the court then examined in detail the purposes and policies of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979), and the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1976 & Supp. In 1979)
and their legislative histories, and determined that these acts actually discouraged
production and utilization of low sulphur coal:
The legislative history reflects to an extent Congressional dissatisfaction
with the use of low sulphur Western coal to meet air emission standards.
House and Conference Committees further reflect a Congressional intent
to (1) reduce reliance upon Western coal and (2) promote expanded use
of high sulphur Eastern and Midwestern coal. Low sulphur Western coal
was relegated a more limited role, to be used principally by existing facili-
ties for which technological upgrading or air pollution control equipment
is unfeasible or impractical.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana, No. 42-657 (1st D. Mont. July 27,
1979). Specific provisions are found in 42 U.S.C. § 7411 and 7425. Interestingly, if
both the Clean Air Act Amendments and the PIFUA had been given equal scru-
tiny by any of the courts, a conflict in these Federal statutes could have been
found.
112. "We do not, however, accept appellants' implicit suggestion that these gen-
eral statements demonstrate a congressional intent to pre-empt all state legisla-
tion that may have an adverse impact on the use of coal." 101 S. Ct. at 2962. See
also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 111 (1978); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649
(1971); see also notes 89-101 supra and accompanying text. In Florida Lime and
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), the Court upheld a California
statute as valid under the Supremacy Clause on the grounds there was no actual
conflict between the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and a
state statute prohibiting the sale of avocados in California of less than eight per-
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Court specifically noted the various clauses of the PIFUA, which
prohibits new electric power plants or fuel burning installations
from using natural gas or petroleum as a primary energy source
after 1989.113 The Court responded to this preemption challenge
by reciting the statute, particularly the provisions for federal
financial assistance to the states to meet the needs imposed by
the coal mining." 4 According to the Court, the statute plainly
contemplated the continuance of state severance taxation as a
means for states to obtain necessary funds to meet the costs and
adverse effects of coal mining.115 Somewhat abruptly, the Court
declared that since the PIFUA was the only federal statute which
even arguably provided a specific basis for a preemption chal-
lenge under the Supremacy Clause, the other statutes did not
merit consideration." 6
cent oil by weight. In addition, the Court noted that the subject matter of the reg-
ulation was within the traditional power of the state (preventing deceptions of
consumers in retail food sales). Id. at 152. The Florida Lime case is analogous to
the instant case as follows: the Court has held that there is no actual, direct con-
flict between the Montana severance tax and the Federal Statutes enumerated by
appellants, and furthermore, that there is no evidence of Congressional intent to
preempt the field of state taxation. Perhaps the Court's strongest argument is that
historically, state taxation powers have been accorded tremendous deference.
This argument is made even stronger in that the tax is not only meant to compen-
sate for the environmental and economic costs of coal mining, but is also a general
revenue tax, imposed for the support of the government. These reasons combined
led the Court to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a hearing on
this issue.
113. Powerplant Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8371-72, 8375 (1976
& Supp. II 1979). See also note 16 supra.
114. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 15-35-108 (Supp. 1975) lists the legislature's deter-
mination of costs and impact of coal mining, from which can be derived a "needs"
analysis. This section, which deals with the statutory allocation of the proceeds of
the tax, provides that 50% of the revenues are allocated to the permanent trust
fund, and following this division, the remaining revenues are allocated, in varying
percentages ranging from 2% to 26.5%, for projects such as alternative energy de-
velopment funds, research and educational funds, direct allocation to the county
where the coal is mined, and to coal highway improvement accounts. There is not
a single provision, directly or indirectly, for a program specifically designed to deal
with the environmental impacts associated with strip mining. Nor is there a pro-
gram designed to deal with another major impact of strip mining on the local area,
namely the creation of "boom towns" which spring up around the mines. For fur-
ther analysis of these two major costs associated with strip mining, see generally
H. LANDSBERG, ENERGY: THE NExT TWENTY YEARS (1979).
115. 101 S. Ct. at 2963. 42 U.S.C. § 8401 (a) (2) provides that "increased revenues,
including severance tax revenues, royalties, and similar fees to the State and local
governments which are associated with the increase in coal.., development ac-
tivities ... shall be taken into account in determining if a State or local govern-
ment lacks financial resources."
116. There is some question as to whether the Court delved deeply enough into
In short, the Court dismissed Supremacy Clause challenges
with two basic replies: first, that the Montana tax was validly im-
posed according to the explicit wording of the 1920 Act and its
1975 amendments; and second, that the allegation that the tax
frustrated national energy policies merited little consideration
since there was no direct conflict with the statutes involved and
that the power of a state to tax activities within its borders has
long enjoyed great deference.
VI. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Blackmun, writing the dissent in Commonwealth
Edison,ll7 argued that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision on
the merits of the case because there were substantial claims al-
leging that the severance taxes were not fairly related to the serv-
ices provided by the state of Montana, and that as such, there was
an intolerable burden placed upon interstate commerce. 118 List-
ing several reasons, Justice Blackmun deemed that a trial was im-
perative. Providing an extensive factual overview of the
legislative history of the Montana tax,"n9 he argued that since the
tax was specifically tailored to fall on out of state consumers, it
should not escape the scrutiny of the Court. In addition, he
hinted as to what was possibly the most explosive issue of the
case, primarily that as a result of the excessive rate of the Mon-
the commands of the PIFUA. As stated earlier, it is now federal law that natural
gas and petroleum, with certain enumerated exceptions, will not be used as pri-
mary energy resources in electric generating plants after 1990. See note 113 supra
and accompanying text. For additional information concerning the effect of the
PIFUA, see generally Toll and Cottingham, Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978 and Possible Amendments Thereto, 11 ST. MARY's L.J. 653 (1980). See
also Brownell, Energy Independence-The Return to Coal, Constraints on Produc-
tion and Utilization of Our Most Abundant National Energy Resource, 11 ST.
MARY's L.J. 677, 695-97 (1980).
117. Joined by Justices Powell and Stevens.
118. 101 S. Ct. at 2964-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Noting the report of Joint Conference Committee of the Montana Legisla-
ture, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the legislators were well aware that the
tax would be exported to out of state consumers, and that there was no doubt that
the coal industry would continue to grow despite the tax. In other words, the out
of state demand is relatively inelastic with regards to the consumption of coal as
affected by the increasing tax, since "the combined coal reserves of Montana...
are simply too great a part of the nation's fossil fuel resources to be ignored be-
cause of taxes at these levels." Id. at 2965-66 (quoting from the statement to ac-
company the Report of the Free Joint Conference Committee on Fuel Taxation, 1).
This opportunistic attitude is reflected in statements made by the Governor of
Montana before a Congressional Panel. There, the Governor conceded that Mon-
tana's needs are more than met by federal royalty payments and other tax reve-
nues related to coal mining. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977:
Hearings Before The Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Sen. Comm.
of Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 629-30 (1977) (statement of
Montana Governor Thomas Judge).
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tana tax, several other western states have considered raising, or
have already raised, the rates of their severance taxes.120
A third point brought out by Justice Blackmun's dissent con-
cerned the increasing percentage of the state's revenue generated
by the Montana tax.121 "In 1972, the then current flat rate sever-
ance tax on coal provided only 0.4% of Montana's total tax reve-
nue. .... -122 This Justice Blackmun contrasted with the present
twenty percent of the total state revenue now generated by the
tax.123
Two additional factors supported the minority's argument that
the effects of the tax should be scrutinized at trial. First, as a re-
sult of the tremendous revenues generated by the tax, the voters
of Montana approved a constitutional amendment which provides
that, beginning in 1980, fifty percent of the revenues generated by
the tax will be channelled into a permanent trust fund, the princi-
ple of which can never be appropriated except with a three-
fourths approval of both houses of the state legislature.124 In ad-
dition, Justice Blackmun noted that in 1979, Montana granted cuts
in both property and personal income taxes for the people of the
state. 25 These factors, taken together, supported the minority's
thesis that a trial was mandated to decide if the thirty percent
severance tax constituted an impermissible burden upon inter-
state commerce since it was not fairly related to the services of
120. 101 S. Ct. at 2967 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Indeed, this prospect is a
problem potentially as divisive as the economic and social conditions that precipi-
tated the Civil War. It does not require any large stretch of the imagination to pic.
ture California, with its vast resources, both renewable and nonrenewable,
withholding the distribution of these resources in exchange for a secure, steady
supply of water from surrounding states. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun noted
one study which concluded that the western states appear to be emerging as vir-
tual tax leaders and that cartels and arrangements between the energy rich states
are being postulated as a form of alliance in the near future. Id. at 2965 n.5. Sup-
porting this contention is a 1974 Montana subcommittee which has formed "to in-
vestigate the feasibility and value of multistate taxation of coal with the Dakotas
and Wyoming and to cooperate with these other states to achieve that end." Id.
(quoting H.R. 45, Subcommittee on Fossil Fuel Taxation, 1974 MONT. LAWS 1620).
121. 101 S. Ct. at 2966 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. Id., citing Griffin & Shelton, Coal Severance Tax Policies in the Rocky
Mountain States, 7 POL. STUDIES J. 29, 33 (1978).
123. Id.
124. 101 S. Ct. at 2966. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, cl. 5.
125. 101 S. Ct. at 2967 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These cuts were accom-
plished by 1979 MONT. LAws CH. 698, amending §§ 15-30-112, 15-30-114, 15-300-122,
and 15-30-142. M.C.A.
the state and discriminated against interstate commerce. 126
Justice Blackmun attributed the majority's failure to recognize
the need for a trial as resulting from its misunderstanding of the
four-part test in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady.127 The dissent
criticized the majority's finding that the proper determination
under the fourth part of Complete128 was "simply whether the
measure of the tax is fixed as a percentage of the value of the coal
taken."129 Justice Blackmun noted that this analysis would elimi-
nate the viability of the Complete test in all cases where a propor-
tional rather than a flat rate tax was challenged.130 Such a test,
Blackmun felt, would be as mechanical as the Heisler approach'31
expressly repudiated by the majority. 32 This approach would
give the state unbridled discretion to impose severance taxes as
long as they were "facially neutral and properly apportioned
taxes."'133 In refuting the majority, the dissent emphasized the
fourth part of Complete, 34 and contended that the tax was not
fairly related to the services provided by the state because, in the
present case, the plaintiffs were required to pay more than their
just share of supporting the state government. 3 5 Justice Black-
mun noted that the Supreme Court had never required that an in-
terstate business be forced to pay more than its own just share of
state tax burden and that dismissing the claims without a trial on
this issue would set a dangerous precedent for the future.136
126. Included in Justice Blackmun's argument is the conclusion of the Hearings
of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, which states that the sever-
ance tax generates revenues far in excess of the direct and indirect impact costs
attributable to coal production. LmrrATIONS ON COAL SEVERANCE TAXATION, supra
note 25, at 3.
127. 101 S. Ct. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
129. 101 S. Ct. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See notes 55-64 supra and accompanying text.
133. 101 S. Ct. at 2970 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
135. 101 S. Ct. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The gravemen of appel-
lants' complaint is that the severance tax does not satisfy the fourth prong
of the Complete test because it is tailored to, and does, force interstate
commerce to pay more than its way. Under our established precedents,
appellants are entitled to a trial on this claim." Id.
136. Id. "To be sure, the task is likely to prove to be a formidable one ; but its
difficulty does not excuse our failure to undertake it." Id. "There is no basis for
the conclusion that the issues presented would be more difficult than those rou-
tinely dealt with in complex civil litigation." Id. at 2971 n.17. In so stating, Justice
Blackmun cited Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954). The
Calvert Court held that the ruling of the Texas Supreme Court, that no trial was
necessary to consider the merits of the effects of a facially neutral tax because
"[the state] has afforded great benefits and protection to [the business]", 347 U.S.
at 163, was in error, and that the proper analysis of the validity of a tax depends
"on other considerations of constitutional policy having reference to the substan-
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In addition, Justice Blackmun felt that judicial scrutiny was es-
pecially necessary where the tax imposed is not likely to be alle-
viated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on
legislation when it adversely affects interests within a state,137 es-
pecially in a situation, as in the instant case, where the taxing
state has almost a virtual monopoly of the resources being taxed,
and the consumption and demand are fixed, and primarily gener-
ated from outside of the state. 38 Nor did the dissent feel that the
Court should be intimidated at the prospect of factually analyzing
the validity of the tax, despite the complex economic considera-
tions involved.139 Justice Blackmun felt that a rough estimate of
whether the tax was grossly disproportionate as borne by the out
of state consumers was required as a preliminary step to deter-
mine if the tax was a legitimate revenue measure. 140
VII. CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
A. Commerce Clause Challenge
There are two major difficulties with the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis of the severance tax issue. First, the Complete Auto Transit
"fair relation" test 141 is simply not applicable to the proportional
tial effects, actual or potential, of the particular tax in suppressing or burdening
unduly the Commerce." 347 U.S. at 164 (quoting Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327
U.S. 416, 424 (1946)).
137. 101 S. Ct. at 2970 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing McGoldrich v. Berwind-
White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46 n.2 (1940)). To be sure, severance taxes have historically
been accorded great deference, beginning in 1922 with the Heisler decision. Yet,
this should not cause the Court to refrain from scrutinizing the tax, especially in a
case such as this, where the burdens of the tax are borne primarily by out of state
consumers who have no voice in the imposition of the tax. In determining if a tax
does discriminate against interstate commerce, "it is relevant to inquire whether a
tax is subject to a local political check ... ." Hellerstein, Developments in the
Law: Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L
REV. 953, 957 (1962).
138. 101 S. Ct. at 2971, citing Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter
and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 232 (1957). See also Hellerstein,
Constitutional Restraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31
NAT. TAX J. 245, 249-50 (1978); R. POSNER, ECONoIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, 510, 514
(2nd Ed. 1977).
139. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
140. Simply a general estimation of whether the tax is a legitimate revenue
measure, roughly comparable to the taxes imposed on other industries, is the test
Blackmun would initially apply to a challenged tax. If the Court were then to find
that the tax is disproportionate to the costs generated by the activity, the Court
would then have to determine if there were a reasonable basis for the disparity.
101 S. Ct. at 297i.
141. See notes 77-85 & 127-31 supra and accompanying text.
"general revenue" tax, since the application of the test will always
result in finding the tax permissible. Second, the decision gives
states unbridled discretion to develop revenue-maximizing taxa-
tion schemes. This will result in the destruction of delicate inter-
state relationships that are crucial to a successful response to the
present national energy crisis.
What the Supreme Court has failed to realize in Commonwealth
Edison is that the taxation of energy resources in an era of in-
creasing scarcity and rapidly mounting costs simply cannot be an-
alyzed according to the previously developed tests. To be certain,
the Complete Auto Transit test is a laudable attempt by the Court
to untangle the complex web of interstate commerce taxation.
The development of a concise, four-part standard has simplified
taxation adjudication in many cases. However, energy resource
taxation is not an area amenable to the Complete four-part test.
Applying this Court's rationale, a proportional tax, no matter
what its rate, will always be acceptable under Complete, as long
as the tax is in some way related to the state's general revenue
fund.142
The Supreme Court did not penetrate far enough into the issue
when it applied the Complete test. Facially, the Court's determi-
nation satisfies the four parts of Complete, but it does not suffi-
ciently examine the complexities of the controversies involved.143
The decision merely serves to exacerbate the energy problems al-
ready at hand. The Court abdicated its responsibility to give the
Montana tax factual scrutiny, and indeed, did not even follow its
own warning in Complete concerning overzealous application of
the "fair relation" standard.'" The elimination of this necessary
scrutiny has forced other states and the mining industry to shoul-
der an unconstitutionally heavy burden of supporting Montana's
142. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 5 supra. A simple application of the fair relation standard, that is
legitimately applicable to ordinary circumstances of interstate business, is simply
not appropriate when analyzing resource taxation. This is because the increased
cost of energy supplied by this coal as a result of the tax affects all consumers in
every aspect of their lives. A tax of this sort inherently has a broader effect on
interstate commerce than does a tax on one single interstate business. Thus, a su-
perficial scrutiny of the "fair relation" and "discrimination" standards as given by
the majority does not answer the plaintiffs' challenges. The Court needs to go fur-
ther to adequately respond to the claim.
144. The Court in Complete did stipulate that its ruling was not meant to be
taken as granting the states the unlimited right to tax interstate commerce.
Any tailored tax of this sort creates an increased danger of error in appor-
tionment, of a discrimination against interstate commerce, and of a lack of
relationship to the services provided by the State.... A tailored tax,
however accomplished, must receive the careful scrutiny of the Courts to
determine whether it produces a forbidden effect on interstate commerce.
430 U.S. at 288-89 n.15.
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costs of general government services. Sadly, the Court shows no
concern over the ramifications of its decision.
There is a second major difficulty in the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in the severance tax case. The decision leaves open, with-
out any guidelines or cautioning words, the entire issue of energy
resource taxation. It is as if the case was decided in a vacuum.
After analyzing the opinion, one cannot help but question
whether the Justices were aware of the 1973 oil embargo, the na-
tional dependence on precarious foreign oil supplies, the increas-
ing prices in power generation, or the demonstrated benefits that
coal utilization can lend in solving the energy crisis.145 Admit-
tedly, it is not the Court's job to establish the rate of the tax; that
is certainly the job for a legislature. But if the Court wished to be
truly responsive to the issue, it could have offered some creative
guidelines for states to follow instead of adhering blindly to Com-
plete.146 Indeed, research reveals that other western coal states
are considering, or have already raised their resource taxes. 147
Had the Court factually scrutinized the Montana tax, it would
have realized this danger.
As mentioned above, the Court felt that establishing the proper
rate of taxation was an issue properly left to state legislative bod-
ies. Yet, in a brief footnote, the majority noted that the contro-
versy has spawned the introduction of several bills in Congress to
limit the permissible rate of severance taxation nationally at
twelve and a half percent.148 Failure of the Court to comment on
national legislation of coal severance taxation seems contrary to
the free reign given to the states in establishing their own taxes.
The Court's handling of the area of legislative responsibility
raises more questions than it answers. It is neither clear whether
the Court believes that Congress should move to enact national
limits to severance taxes, nor whether it would find such limits
constitutional. 149 Indeed, if the Supreme Court wished to en-
145. Western coal offers two critical advantages over eastern coal: it is less ex-
pensive, $6 to $9 cheaper per ton, than eastern coal, and it is less polluting than
eastern coal because of its low sulphur content. In addition, future demand for
coal is expected as the development of coal gasification increases. Binder, Strip
Mining, the Wes and the Nation, 12 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 2, 4 (1977).
146. See Limitation on Coal Severance Taxation, supra note 25.
147. 101 S. Ct. at 2967 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Bills introduced: S. 2695, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); H.R. Res. 6654, 7163,
6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S. 178, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
149. It is apparent that the Court proceeded on the questionable assumption
courage national legislation, why did it leave the matter before
the states to do as they saw fit?
B. Supremacy Clause Challenge
The expansive view given to Montana's power to tax coal min-
ing, accomplished by a very narrow interpretation of the preemp-
tion cases, spells defeat for the United States in its quest for
energy independence. The energy shortage is a very critical na-
tional concern of the twentieth century; yet the Supreme Court
insists that Montana's sovereign right to tax coal mining remains
unaffected by the energy crisis.
To be certain, a state's power to tax is not to be lightly inter-
fered with. The author suggests, however, that national energy
problems demand new insights in the application of established
preemption tests. Such strict adherence to states' rights theories,
especially with respect to taxation of nonrenewable energy re-
sources, has no place in an era of energy uncertainty. There
should be no requirement of direct or actual conflict between a
federal statute mandating the increased utilization of coal and a
state statute imposing excessive burdens on the price and availa-
bility of that coal. Common sense tells every citizen that outra-
geous tax rates frustrate any attempt to solve the energy crisis.
The Court should have directly acknowledged the strong possi-
bility that the Montana legislators were acting as revenue maxi-
mizers when they were structuring the tax. The Court's decision
ignores any idea that perhaps the legislation was entirely polit-
ical, and that the legislators ignored the needs of the nation in
raising their tax. Rather, one concludes that the Court believed
that the Montana legislators were acting as benefactors, demon-
strating a rational, well balanced concern for the ramifications of
the tax upon all consumers affected. Such is simply not reality. 150
that an issue as politically divisive as resource taxation could be fairly and effec-
tively dealt with by Congress.
150. See notes 4 & 74 supra and accompanying text. The plaintiffs have charac-
terized the 30% tax as "exacting a tribute from the inhabitants of [Montana's] en-
ergy poor sister states." Brief for the Appellant at 2, 101 S. Ct. 2946. Recent facts
reveal the increase in Montana's wealth:
In 1979, shipments to out of state consumers aggregated 28 million tons of
coal, accounting for at least 90% of the value of Montana's production.
Plaintiffs paid severance taxes of about 60 million dollars on these ship-
ments. Under terms of existing contracts, they estimate the amount paya-
ble over the next two decades will reach several billion dollars.
Id. A more immediate effect of the tax may be measured in terms of new con-
tracts entered into after the tax was imposed. Prior to 1975, various utilities had
signed long term contracts for approximately 800 million tons of coal. Eleven of
these contracts were for 20 years or more. After the 1975 tax increase the percent-
age increase of new contracts decreased dramatically:
[Vol. 9: 487, 1982] Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State of Montana
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The largest flaw in the United States Supreme Court's analysis
of the constitutionality of the severance tax concerns the applica-
tion of the fair relation standard in Complete Auto Transit v.
Brady.'5 ' It is this application the author would adjust in deter-
mining the validity of the tax.
As suggested by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, the Court did
indeed have the ability to factually scrutinize the tax to deter-
mine if there was a fair relation between it and the services pro-
vided by the state. Rather than abdicate its responsibility, the
Court should have instead applied the holdings and rationale
found in Nippert v. City of Richmond 152 and Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,153 in making this determination. Taken together, Nippert
and Pike hold that the constitutional validity of a tax depends on
its substantial effects, actual or potential, upon commerce, and
that when the burden imposed upon commerce exceeds its puta-
tive local benefits, the permissible degree of the tax depends on
the interest being taxed and whether the state's interest in taxa-
tion can be promoted in an alternative manner with a lesser im-
pact upon commerce. Applied to the instant case, an examination
of the actual and potential effects of the extreme severance tax' 54
indicates that they outweigh the interest of Montana in imposing
it. The interest of Montana could fairly be promoted with a lesser
impact on commerce merely by lowering the rate of the tax to one
MONTANA COAL PRODUCTION 1970-1979
Before 30% tax tons mined (X1000) percentage change
1970 1,280
1971 7,299 -
1972 7,931 8.7
1973 10,541 32.9
1974 13,675 29.7
1975 22,087 61.5
1976 26,181 18.5
1977 27,000 4.6
1978 26,679 2.6
1979 July 17,083
The growth rate on the chart demonstrates a definite decrease in the amount of
coal produced after the tax was imposed. Brief for Appellant, p.4.
151. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
152. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
153. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
154. See note 37 supra.
which fairly imposes the burdens of supporting the state
government.
The issue of energy resource taxation is very complex. Simple
solutions are not available. Yet, the Supreme Court has re-
sponded to the first substantial coal controversy of the current en-
ergy crisis by placing a band-aid on a growing cancer. At best,
such actions are founded upon illusions about the politics of taxa-
tion. At worst, the Court's decision, demonstrating a lack of un-
derstanding or responsiveness to the entire issue, welcomes us to
a national nightmare.'I 5
In holding that the Montana severance tax does not merit fac-
tual scrutiny, the Court fell back on ideological theories rather
than practical considerations. Edward Miller described the prob-
lem that arises when one is confronted with a dilemma that is not
well understood when he stated that "ti]f a public issue is not
well understood, perhaps because of its inherent complexity, ide-
ology will tend to dominate public choice. If the prevailing ideol-
ogy happens to correlate well within the pragmatic answer, the
nation is fortunate; if not, the nation is poorly served."156
NANCY K. STALCUP
155. The immediacy of the effects is brought out in the following passage:
Unless the Court acts to safeguard the national economy against the indi-
vidual state's exploitation of a fortuit-the location of a natural re-
source-the prospect looms of a wealthgap dividing the nation into
warning camps. A few states, rich in mineral deposits, foresee overflowing
coffers, vast improvements in public services, substantial elimination of lo-
cal and state burdens, and the benefits of widespread economic prosper-
ity, all by reason of state exploitation of energy resources through the
device of exported taxes. The rest of the nation, dependent for its survival
on these costly sources of energy, faces deficits, deterioration, and decline.
Brief of Amici Curiae at 3, 101 S. Ct. 2946.
156. E. MILLER, Energy Politics: The Irrelevant Debate 275 (H. Browne, ed.,
1977).
